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Abstract: 
This paper proposes a possible way of assessing the effect of interest rate dynamics on 
changes in the decision-making approach, communication strategy and operational framework 
of a Central bank. Through a GARCH specification we show that the USA and Euro area 
displayed a limited but significant spillover of volatility from money market to longer-term 
rates. We then checked the stability of this phenomenon in the most recent period of improved 
policymaking and found empirical evidence that the transmission of overnight volatility along 
the yield curve vanished soon after specific policy changes of the FED and ECB.  
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1. Introduction
1 
The understanding of Central banks’ actions by the public is as important as the 
actions themselves. Indeed, the comprehension of the monetary policy decision-making 
process and the way expectations about future moves are formed directly influence the 
effectiveness of monetary policy itself. Eventually, the success of current changes in official 
rates in affecting spending decisions by households and investment by firms is almost 
entirely dependent on the impact of such changes on other financial markets’ prices and 
yields, such as longer-term interest rates, equity prices and exchanges rates, which in turn 
depend on the expectations of future developments in official rates. 
Many Central banks have attempted in recent years to reduce the uncertainty arising 
from policy decisions. To this end, important changes in the conduct of monetary policy 
have been implemented. New trends have emerged since the early 1990s: (i) an increase in 
the amount of information regularly released to the public aimed at explaining in details the 
decisions of the policy maker; (ii) a move towards gradualism in policy action, namely the 
tendency to adjust policy rates in small steps in the same direction; (iii) improvements in 
monetary policy operational frameworks and clearer implementation rules.  
In order to influence private sector expectations, and driven by the idea that a broad 
knowledge of the decision-making process by the public would make the monetary policy 
authority’s job easier, Central banks make an effort to provide in an open, clear and timely 
manner all the relevant information about the underlying strategy, the final and intermediate 
targets and the related horizon (Woodford, 2005). A second way in which the monetary 
authorities try to influence expectation formation is by establishing certain patterns of 
behaviour (Bernanke, 2004). In fact, under a gradualist regime the Central bank leads market 
participants to anticipate that changes in the policy rate will be followed by further changes 
in the same direction. In addition, they will almost certainly be able to anticipate the 
magnitude of the changes: variations in excess of 25 basis points have been increasingly rare 
                                                           
1  We would like to thank Paolo Angelini, Michele Manna, Benjamin Sahel and participants to the XV Tor 
Vergata Conference on Banking and Finance, to the II ICEEE Congress and to seminars held at the European 
Central Bank and the Goethe University of Frankfurt for very helpful suggestions and discussions. The paper 
does not necessarily reflect the views of the Banca d'Italia. 
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in industrial economies. For instance, between January 2001 and June 2003 the FED reduced 
its policy rate 13 consecutive times, while from June 2004 it increased it 17 times (all of 
them by 25 basis points). At the same times the ECB maintained a similar approach: the last 
change of 50 basis points was June 2003.
2
Finally, operational frameworks have undergone important changes to avoid an 
additional source of noise in the communication and implementation of monetary policy 
stance. Since the implementation of monetary policy decisions typically takes place through 
the steering of very short-term interest rates, high volatility in money market rates may 
potentially obscure the signalling of the policy stance. In particular, Central banks are 
concerned about the possible weakening of the “neutrality” of liquidity management. A 
liquidity policy is “neutral” whenever the monetary policy stance is determined by the 
decisions taken by the competent policy-making body with respect to official rates, rather 
than influenced by the management of liquidity conditions.
3  
There is broad agreement that enhanced operational procedures together with better 
communication strategies and increased transparency have improved the predictability of 
Central banks decisions, reduced the volatility in the money market and enhanced the 
signalling content of very short-term rates (Hilton; 2005, Woodford; 2005, Issing; 2005). 
Less firm evidence is available concerning the consequences of the increased monetary 
policy predictability: has it had any appreciable consequence on some variables of interest? 
Here the evidence is less clear-cut. Attempts at testing the hypothesis that better monetary 
policymaking may be the cause of improved macroeconomic performance over the last 20 
years have been made. For instance, Stock and Watson (2002) argue that better 
policymaking is unlikely to be a main cause of the great moderation (reduced GDP and 
inflation variability) since 1985. However, the quest for such effects may pose serious 
                                                           
2 Another argument in favour of gradualism concerns the uncertainty in which Central bankers operate. A 
primary source of uncertainty relates to the partial knowledge of the underlying structure of the economy 
(Brainard, 1967). An additional source is related to the fact that economic data is dynamic and significant 
updates are quite frequent, so that policymakers are called to make decisions with imperfect knowledge of the 
current state of the economy (Orphanides, 2003). For other arguments in favour and against gradualism in 
monetary policy see among others Rudebush (2001), Söderström (2002), Woodford (2003), Angeloni et al. 
(2003).  
3 See Furfine (2003), Clews (2005) and Durré and Nardelli (2007). 
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identification problems. Obvious intermediate steps in this search may focus on the effect of 
specific policy changes on variables directly related to monetary policy decisions. Demiralp 
and Jordà (2004) examine the reaction of the term structure to the explicit announcement of 
the Federal funds rate target, initiated by the FED in 1994. They found that after 1994 the 
reaction of longer term rates to surprises in the target tends to decline relative to the pre-1994 
period, and argue that this reduced response may indeed have been driven by better 
understanding of the way policy works. In addition, Swanson (2006) shows that financial 
markets and private sector forecasters have become better able to forecast the FED funds rate 
at horizon out to several months and that the increase in FED transparency played an 
important role since similar improvements in private sector forecasts of GDP and inflation 
did not occur. 
In this paper we attempt an alternative route to gauge the effects of improved monetary 
policymaking on interest rates: we analyse the transmission of volatility along the yield 
curve and more specifically, we first assess the extent to which volatility is transmitted from 
policy instrument rates to longer maturities. In line with previous literature, we find that 
some volatility spillover is indeed present, both in the US and the Euro area, over an 
extended time span. Next, we check whether this volatility transmission is stable over time 
or whether structural changes can be detected in concomitance with episodes of policy 
reform. In principle, the spillover of volatility from the overnight rate to longer maturities 
may be viewed as a market flaw. Higher volatility may translate into term premia, thereby 
increasing equilibrium levels of nominal and real long-term rates and disturbing the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy impulses. In this regard, the policy trends 
mentioned above should have had a dampening effect on volatility transmission, improving 
monetary policy effectiveness. A change (reduction) in the volatility transmission is used 
here as an indicator of the enhanced effectiveness of the monetary policy and thus for the 
benefit of the implemented changes. We found that volatility transmission had not only 
declined in recent years, but completely vanished. 
Tests of structural break with unknown breakpoint suggest that the drop in volatility 
transmission has occurred close to specific policy changes, both in the US and the Euro area. 
Specifically, in the former the break is recorded soon after the introduction in the statements 
of post-FOMC meetings of an explicit “balance of risk” to the economic outlook, while in    5
the latter immediately after the launch of a new operational framework. Overall, our findings 
are consistent with the idea that improvements in the monetary policy framework may be 
responsible for the documented changes in the behaviour of volatility transmission.  
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the model specifications for the 
overnight rate and the volatility transmission along the yield curve; Section 3 assesses the 
evolution of the pass-through mechanism in the most recent period of improved policy-
making; Section 4 concludes. 
2. Volatility transmission along the yield curve 
2.1 The overnight market 
Our empirical strategy is the following. In this Subsection and the next we try to 
identify satisfactory statistical models for interest rates at various maturities and to test for 
the presence of volatility transmission from the shortest end of the yield curve (the overnight 
market) to longer maturities. In Section 3 we then assess whether the recent changes in the 
monetary policy operational procedures and in the way communication with the public is 
managed may have had an impact on these models (e.g. generated some structural 
instability). 
A first lesson that can be drawn from the empirical literature is that several methods 
are used to measure volatility, each with advantages and shortcomings. However, in recent 
years the conditional-volatility modelling (ARCH and its variants) has quickly gained 
relevance and is nowadays one of the most used tools in applied financial research.
4 Thus, 
along the line of empirical studies on the same topic and given the relatively similar 
                                                           
4 See Engle (1983) and Bollerslev (1986) for the seminal contributions. A second important strand of 
empirical financial research is instead based on the concept of realized volatility (Andersen and Bollerslev, 
1997; 1998). As for the most recent empirical contributions see Bomfim (2003), Demiralp et al. (2006), Bali 
and Wu (2006) for the USA, while for the Euro area refer to Hartman et al. (2001), Perez-Quiros and 
Rodriguez (2006), Nautz and Offermanns (2007). Prati et al. (2003) and Bartolini and Prati (2006) provide 
cross-country studies of the different behaviour of overnight markets in several industrialised economies 
including USA and Euro area.    6
operational framework of the FED and ECB, we adopt the following GARCH model for the 
USA and the Euro area overnight interest rates:
5
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In the mean equation (1) rt denotes the nominal overnight interest rate, ot is the 
official interest rate, DXt is a matrix of calendar dummies. In the variance equation (2) the 
dummy variable St,  which takes the value 1 if εt<0 and 0 otherwise, allows for a different 
reaction of volatility to positive and negative surprises (Glosten et al., 1993). We modelled 
the overnight rate in differences, since each rate turned out to be an I(1) variable, and 
introduced as Error Correction Term the spread between the overnight and the official rate. 
We also added several dummy variables to take into account calendar effects (end of month, 
quarter and year) and maintenance period effects both in the mean and variance equation. 
The conditional variance process together with the conditional mean specification was 
jointly estimated using the maximum likelihood technique.
 6
Regarding the US overnight market, we use the Federal Funds effective rate (FF) as 
the endogenous variable and the Funds target as the official rate. The latter rate has been 
publicly announced since February 1994, while in the preceding years, the FOMC did not 
formally target the Funds rate. Accordingly, our sample period starts in March 1994 and 
ends in February 2006. In the mean equation, the impact effect of a 1 percentage point 
change in the target rate on the overnight rate is 0.54 points (Table 1). Thereafter, almost any 
remaining differential between official and overnight interest rate is removed at the very 
high rate of 79 per cent per period (the ECT coefficient). On the final business day of each 
month – the so-called high-payment-flow days – we detect an increase of both conditional 
mean and volatility. With reference to the other calendar day effects, we find that the 
parameter on the end-quarter dummy is strongly positive while that at the year end is 
significantly negative. In addition, evidence of a positive effect is found on the last days of 
                                                           
5 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2005) and European Central Bank (2005) for a 
detailed description of the operational framework of the two Central banks. 
6 See Table A1 and A2 in the Appendix for the exact data definition and dummy specification.    7
the maintenance period. A dummy variable valued 1 in the days after the terrorist attack on 
11 September 2001 takes into account the extraordinary changes in the FF rate in those days, 
while, the coefficient γ turn out to be significant, suggesting evidence of asymmetric effects 
in volatility.
7
Table 1 
ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR OVERNIGHT MARKETS 
 
Fed Funds 
  
θ   -0.0048 **  ν   0.0018 ** 
ρ   -0.7884 **  α    0.3642 ** 
φ1 0.0898 **  β    0.1181 ** 
φ2 0.0855 **  γ  0.1990 ** 
φ3 0.1084 **  ψEM 0.0078 ** 
η0 0.5357 **  ψEQ 0.1779 ** 
ωEM 0.0954 **  ψEEEMP 0.0012 ** 
ωBM 0.0477 **  ψEEMP 0.0039 ** 
ωEQ 0.2240 **  ψEMP 0.0133 ** 
ωEY -0.5673 **     
ωEEEMP 0.0312 **   
ωEMP 0.0178 *   
ω9/11/2001 -0.7125 **  
          
EONIA 
          
θ   0.0108 **  ν   0.0002 ** 
ρ   -0.2390 **  α    0.2466 ** 
φ1 -0.0594 *  β    0.3541 ** 
η0 0.3924 **  ψEM 0.0022 ** 
ωEM 0.0338 **  ψBM -0.0032 ** 
ωEQ 0.0525 **  ψEEEMP 0.0062 ** 
ωEMP -0.0010 *  ψEEMP 0.0405 ** 
    ψEMP 0.0079 * 
          
NOTE: Daily observations. Sample period: 1.3.1994 - 28.2.2006 for the 
USA and 1.1.1999 - 28.2.2006 for the Euro Area. An (two) asterisk(s) 
denotes statistical significance at 95% (99%). 
 
Regarding the Euro area overnight market we rely on the EONIA rate (Euro OverNight 
Index Average), while we consider the rate on the MROs (Main Refinancing Operations) as 
                                                           
7 The diagnostic statistic LM2 did not detect any residual heteroskedasticity up to fifth order. The stability 
condition of the GARCH model is always satisfied (α + β < 1) and the non negativity of the conditional variance 
is ensured by the positive value of ν, α and β.    8
the official rate. Our sample period ranges from January 1999 to February 2006. The mean-
variance model appears reasonably well-specified: the diagnostic test for ARCH effects 
(LM2) up to fifth order is easily satisfied and most parameters values turned out to be as 
expected. In the mean model, the impact effect of a change of 1 percentage point in the 
official interest rate is 0.39 points in the overnight rate (Table 1). Thereafter, any remaining 
differential between official and overnight interest rate is eradicated at the rate of 24 per cent 
per period. Most likely due to window-dressing effects, on the last day of the month and of 
the quarter the EONIA rate increases by 3 and 5 basis points, respectively. As for the 
variance equation, an increase in volatility is detected in the last days of the maintenance 
period and at the end of the month (Moschitz; 2004, Prati et al.; 2006, Peres-Quiros and 
Rodriguez; 2006).  
2.2 Volatility transmission 
The volatility in the overnight market is usually interpreted as a “technical” volatility 
mainly due to banks’ liquidity management, i.e. it is not directly related to the monetary 
policy stance of the Central bank. However, the communication policy of the Central bank 
and possible changes in the monetary policy strategy may indirectly affect the overnight 
market. In fact, there is the risk that the volatility in the daily money market is unwarrantly 
transmitted to longer-term rates, which are relevant to real economic decisions such as firms’ 
investment and households’ consumption. This is why, among other reasons, monetary 
authorities try to stabilise volatility in the very short-end of the yield curve and to be as 
transparent as possible in the management of its decision-making process. 
In order to assess the existence of the volatility transmission across maturities, we  
introduce the conditional variance derived from the overnight GARCH model as an 
exogenous variable in the estimates of the volatility model at longer maturities. This 
procedure implicitly assumes that overnight volatility is not Granger-caused by longer-term 
interest rate innovations and thus that the transmission may go in one direction only (Ayuso 
et al.; 1997). In addition, the conditional variance is introduced as an explanatory variable 
also in the mean equation of each maturity date to check for a possible direct effect of the 
volatility on the level of interest rates. Then, equations (1) and (2) become:    9
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where r
i denotes the nominal interest rate with maturity i = 1-month, 3-month, 12-month, 5-
year and 10-year and the suffix on stands for the overnight market.  
Table 2 
VOLATILITY TRANSMISSION FROM THE FED FUNDS RATE 
 
  1-month    3-month   12-month   5-year   10-year   
                
θ      0.0017   0.0016  0.0009   0.0005   -0.0008  
ρ     -0.0155 **        
φ1 0.1262 **  0.1134 *  0.0338 *  0.0577 **  0.0542 ** 
φ2     0.0354 *    
η0 0.0513 **  -0.0405 **  0.0446 **    
ωEM     -0.0226 **  -0.0209 ** 
ωEY      -0.0281 *  0.0242 * 
ω9/11/2001 0.1941 **  -0.1238 **      
k   0.0080  0.1230  0.0230   -0.0043   0.0019  
ν      0.0012 **  0.0007 **  0.0000 **  0.0000  0.0000  
α    0.0320 **  0.0983 **  0.0486 **  0.0396 **  0.0346 ** 
β    0.5572 **  0.5741 **  0.9338 **  0.9440 **  0.9465 ** 
λ    0.0017 **  0.0017 *  0.0006 **  0.0005 *  0.0006 ** 
ψEM 0.0025 **  0.0008 **  0.0010 **  0.0014 **  0.0006 * 
ψBM -0.0012 **       0.0008 ** 
ψEQ -0.0005 **    -0.0005 **    
ψEY -0.0000 **  -0.0001 **      
                 
ELASTSR 0.0156 **  0.0072 *  0.0017 **  0.0011 *  0.0035 ** 
ELASTLR 0.0353 **  0.0552 *  0.0259 **  0.0468 *  0.0656 ** 
                   
NOTE: Daily observations. Sample period: 1.3.1994 - 28.2.2006. An (two) asterisk(s) denotes statistical 
significance at 95% (99%).  
 
The focus of the exercise is on the coefficient λ
i. A positive value for the coefficient is  
consistent with the hypothesis that higher variance in the overnight market translates into 
higher variance for longer rates. For the FED Funds the coefficient is positive and significant 
in the variance equations for each maturity (Table 2).
8 By looking at the 1-month market we 
                                                           
 
8 As for the other coefficients, at longer maturities the levels of interest rates are less affected by calendar 
and maintenance period days both in the Euro area and USA. The ECT coefficient is significant only for the 1-   10
can see that the pass-through is relatively small (0.0017). However, the magnitude of the 
estimated  λ
i is not a direct measure of the economic significance of the volatility 
transmission, since the volatility of the overnight market is usually much larger than that of 
longer rates.
9
In the bottom panel of Table 2 we report two adjusted measures of this pass-through. 
The first is the average impact elasticity, ELASTSR =  i
on
i
, 2
, 2
σ
σ
λ , i.e. the impact elasticity 
computed at the sample average of both volatilities. The second is the average equilibrium 
elasticity, computed as ELASTLR = i
on
i
i
, 2
, 2
1 σ
σ
β
λ
−
. These elasticities give the percentage 
increase in the variance of rate i due to a 1 percent increase in the variance of the overnight 
rate, when both variances are at average level. In particular, the equilibrium elasticity is 
more relevant to assess the impact of a permanent shift in the volatility of the FED Funds. 
According to these values, we found that the pass-through rate is around 1.5% for the 1-
month at impact and much smaller at longer maturities. The adjustment in equilibrium is 
somehow stronger ranging between 3.5 and 6.6%.  
For the Euro area the evidence is similar to that of USA: there is a statistically 
significant transmission of volatility from the EONIA to longer-term rates, including the 10-
year benchmark rate (Table 3), though the volatility pass-through is quantitatively limited. 
The impact elasticity for the 1-month market is below 1.5%, while that of the other 
maturities is even smaller. The equilibrium elasticity suggests again a stronger impact in the 
long-run: between 1.5 and 7.6%. The similarity between the Euro area and the USA is 
confirmed by looking at the absolute transmission of the volatility: both the pass-through 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
month maturity; in addition it is much smaller than in the overnight model suggesting a significantly slower 
adjustment to official rate changes. There are no volatility transmission effects in the mean equation in any of 
the markets under analysis (k
i is not significantly different from zero), implying that the determination of the 
yields at longer maturities does not depend on the (conditional) volatility in the EONIA or the FED Funds rate.  
9 See figures 3 and 4 in the next Section for a comparison of market volatility levels across maturities. 
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coefficient of equation (4) and the (average) conditional volatility in the overnight rates are 
of comparable magnitude.
 10
Table 3 
VOLATILITY TRANSMISSION FROM THE EONIA RATE 
 
                
                
  1-month    3-month   12-month   5-year   10-year   
                  
               
θ     0.0086   0.0017 *  0.0001  -0.0006    -0.0068 ** 
ρ    -0.0185 **         
φ1  0.1896 **  0.5102 **  0.1230 **  -0.0077  *  -0.0097  
η0  0.2134 **  0.1765 **  0.1637 **  0.0639  **  0.0283 * 
τ             4.0103 * 
ωEM 0.0068 *          
κ     0.0564  -0.0032   0.0140   -0.0048   -0.0249  
                 
                 
ν     0.0005 **  0.0003 **  0.0000 **  0.0000  **  0.0000 ** 
α     0.0889 **  0.1396 **  0.0424 **     0.0271 ** 
β     0.5569 **  0.5227 **  0.9423 **  0.9476  **  0.9619 ** 
λ     0.0016 **  0.0011 **  0.0006 **  0.0007  *  0.0005 * 
ψEM -0.0013 **  -0.0007 **  0.0003 **  0.0010  *   
ψEY         0.0002 ** 
ψEMP -0.0004 **  -0.0008 **        
                 
                 
ELASTSR 0.0122 **  0.0015 **  0.0010 **  0.0034  *  0.0029 * 
ELASTLR 0.0275 **  0.0269 **  0.0151 **  0.0644  *  0.0759 * 
                  
NOTE: Daily observations. Sample period: 1.1.1999 - 28.2.2006. An (two) asterisk(s) denotes statistical 
significance at 95% (99%).  
 
In summary, the above evidence suggests that a limited part of the volatility in the 
short-end of the yield curve is transmitted to longer rates. As already mentioned, the 
volatility in the overnight rate is mostly related to the daily management of banks’ liquidity 
while longer-term rates reflect broader expectations about future monetary policy and 
macroeconomic developments. Thus, at least theoretically, there shouldn’t be any volatility 
spillover along the yield curve, especially at the 5- and 10-year horizon.
11
                                                           
 
10 The conditional volatility in the overnight market is a generated regressor when used in the model for 
longer maturity rates and as such it may lead to an inefficient two-step estimation process if the (G)ARCH 
estimated in the first step is misspecified (Pagan and Ullah, 1987).  
11 Our findings are broadly consistent with the previous (limited) empirical literature. Relying on an 
EGARCH over the period between January 1999 and November 2003, Alonso and Blanco (2005) find a 
significant transmission of the EONIA volatility to the 1-month and 3-month rates, but not to the 12-month    12
3. A structural break test 
As mentioned in the Introduction, in the most recent period – at least from early 2000 
– changes in the operational procedures, improved transparency, better communication and a 
trend over gradualism in monetary policy decisions has led to more efficient policy making 
and a reduced volatility in money markets. In this section we would like to assess whether 
this widespread improvement in the monetary policy framework has also had an impact on 
the “undesired” transmission of overnight interest rate volatility along the yield curve. 
Figure 1 
LR TEST FOR A BREAK IN THE FED FUNDS VOLATILITY 
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In order to evaluate whether a change in the estimates and patterns documented above 
has indeed occurred, we followed the testing procedure of Andrews (1993) and Andrews and 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
rate. For the USA, Abad and Novales (2004) and Lee (2006) hint to a limited volatility transmission which is 
often statistically significant at usual probability levels within the 12-month horizon. 
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Ploberger (1994). In particular, the procedure is able to detect a structural break in the level 
of the volatility when the timing of the break is unknown.
12
Figure 2 
LR TEST FOR A BREAK IN THE EONIA VOLATILITY 
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Figure 1 depicts the recursive value of the LR test for the FED Funds. Both average-
LR and sup-LR statistics indicate a strong rejection of the null hypothesis of no structural 
change in the overnight volatility. In respect to the time of the structural break, the peak of 
the test is in July 2000. This date is not far from the introduction by the FED of an explicit 
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] ]
12  More precisely, we introduced a dummy B(j) that equals 0 if t ≤ j and 1 otherwise in equation (4) and 
then we tested the null hypothesis that coefficient of B(j) is 0 over all potential break dates j,  , with 
, and   by means of standard LR(j) statistics. Finally, we computed the average-LR and 
the sup-LR test statistics. The asymptotic distributions of the tests are non standard and depend on the number 
of coefficients that are allowed to break and on the fraction of the sample that is examined (Andrews; 1993, 
Andrews and Ploberger; 1994). Moreover, the point at which the LR(j) statistic hits the maximum is an 
estimate of the break date. 
[ 2 1,T T j∈
[ T T 15 . 0 1 = [ T T 85 . 0 2 =
    14
“balance of risks” warning to the economic outlook in the post-meeting statement (January 
2000). Figure 1 shows vertical lines in correspondence with other important changes in the 
conduct and communication of the monetary policy, which in principle may have had an 
influence on the volatility of the overnight market.
13 While multiple breaks are clearly 
possible, we do not pursue their identification here, and assume that a structural break in the 
volatility equation occurred in correspondence with the peak of the test in July 2000. The 
analogous exercise conducted on the Euro area overnight rate also reveals a likely structural 
break in the volatility equation (Figure 2). The maximum probability for a break is reached 
in May 2004, just after the implementation of the new operational framework adopted by the 
ECB in March 2004.  
Figure 3 
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13 See Swanson (2006) and Durré and Nardelli (2007) for a list of all relevant changes in the monetary 
policy conduct of the FED and ECB. Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) propose an index which measures the 
improvement in transparency over time due to adjustments in the communication strategy and the operational 
framework of 9 major Central banks. 
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Figures 3 and 4 depict the pattern of volatility in each market for both economies 
under analysis. It is evident that the volatility has decreased in the second half of the sample 
(after the break), especially in the overnight markets. Also note that, consistently with the 
findings of Ayuso et al. (1997) for some European countries and Alonso and Blanco (2005) 
for the Euro Area, the U-shaped pattern of the volatility across maturities up to 12 months is 
maintained, while the curve exhibits an overall snake-shaped behaviour due to the reduction 
of volatility at the 10-year horizon (Piazzesi, 2005). 
Figure 4 
Means of conditional variance in the Euro Area 
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Needless to say, the aspect we would like to assess is whether the volatility 
transmission from the money market has changed after the break in the overnight volatility 
level. To check for the change, we introduce a duBREAK step-dummy in our regressions and 
consider the conditional overnight volatility derived from the model assuming the structural 
break.
14  
                                                           
14 The estimates of equations (1)-(2) for the overnight markets obtained assuming one break (in July 2000 
for the US and in May 2004 for the Euro area) are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix.    16
Specifically, for all rates we leave equation (3) unchanged and we model volatility as 
follows:  
(5)    .  DX duBREAK duBREAK
i on
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i on
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i i
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A significant value of λ
i
1 would suggest a change in the volatility spill-over across 
markets. In particular, a positive (negative) value would hint to an increased (reduced) pass-
through, while the non-significance of the estimate would point to an unchanged framework. 
Table 4 
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN VOLATILITY TRANSMISSION  
 
Federal Funds 
                
  1-month    3-month   12-month   5-year   10-year   
                   
ν     0.0007  **  0.0001 **  0.0001 **  0.0001 **  0.0000 * 
α    0.2420  **  0.0551 **  0.0486 **  0.0164 **  0.0411 ** 
β     0.5215  **  0.7740 **  0.6740 **  0.8307 **  0.9347 ** 
λ0    0.0034  **  0.0019 **  0.0011 **  0.0018 *  0.0009 ** 
λ1  -0.0033  **  -0.0014 **  -0.0005 **  -0.0012 *  -0.0005 * 
δ   -0.0007  **  -0.0001 *  -0.0001 *  0.0000  0.0000  
                   
EONIA 
                
  1-month    3-month   12-month   5-year   10-year   
                   
ν    0.0005  **  0.0003 **  0.0000   0.0001 **  0.0000  
α    0.0272  **  0.0143 *  0.0453 **  0.0491 **  0.0178 ** 
β    0.4394  **  0.4969 **  0.9290 **  0.9402 **  0.9677 ** 
λ0    0.0018  **  0.0030 **  0.0008 **  0.0011 *  0.0016 * 
λ1  -0.0015  **  -0.0032 **  -0.0005 *  -0.0018 *  -0.0007 * 
δ   -0.0004  **  -0.0001 **  0.0000   0.0000  0.0000  
                   
Daily observations. Sample period: 1.03.1994 - 28.2.2006 for USA and 1.1.1999 - 
28.2.2006 for Euro area. An (two) asterisk(s) denotes statistical significance at 95% (99%). 
 
Tables 4 shows the estimated results for both economies and for each market. The 
remarkable result is that the volatility transmission from the overnight market has strongly 
diminished in the second half of the sample in all markets for both currencies. The 
coefficient of the multiplicative dummy is always negative and significantly different from 
zero in each specification, while the coefficient λ
i
0 is always significant and usually larger 
than the corresponding estimate over the broad sample (see Table 3), suggesting that indeed 
in the first part of the sample the transmission was stronger. In addition, the Wald test never    17
rejects the null hypothesis that the sum of the transmission coefficients is zero thus 
suggesting that the volatility transmission has completely vanished in the most recent period. 
Of course the underlying causes of the improved functioning of the money market 
cannot be determined with certainty since many factors may have concurred with the final 
outcome. Although the improvement is likely to have been gradual rather than directly 
linked to a single episode, our results are fully consistent with the hypothesis that an 
improved general framework of monetary policy decision-making has contributed to the 
vanishing of an undesired volatility spillover across maturities. In addition, Table 4 shows 
that for some markets the dummy variable for a break in the level of volatility is non-
significantly different from zero at the usual confidence levels, thus suggesting that the 
vanishing of the volatility pass-through is independent of a possible reduction of volatility in 
each market. This in turn suggests that it might be a phenomenon attributable to a different 
source than the “good luck” hypothesis or the supposed improved ability of the economic 
system as a whole to withstand shocks. What we suggest is that indeed the more open, 
gradual and transparent behaviour on the part of Central banks has let financial agents 
operate in an increasingly efficient way. 
4. Conclusion 
The efficient functioning of the overnight market plays a key role in the financial 
structure and in the monetary policy conduct of most world economies. On the one hand, 
overnight rates are the anchor for the term structure of interest rates, but on the other, 
operating procedures of central banks are designed to affect the supply and demand of 
liquidity reserves among credit institutions. Thus, volatility transmission along the yield 
curve may weaken the signalling power of the monetary policy stance. Also the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy impulses may be concerned by a large volatility spillover 
from overnight to longer-term rate.  
In order to maintain a low level of volatility, Central banks have devised various ways 
in which they directly and indirectly affect the liquidity conditions in the overnight market. 
In the last two decades, we have witnessed an overall increase in the transparency of Central 
banking, improved communication strategies and a gradual approach in the decision making    18
process. Additionally the operational framework has undergone a series of improvements in 
order to maintain a “neutral” liquidity policy, i.e. the monetary policy stance has to be 
determined only by the decisions taken by the Central bank concerning the official rates. 
Since the monetary authority operational rules have a clear influence on the functioning of 
the overnight market, any change in the framework may affect the dynamics of the short-end 
of the yield curve. Thus, the behavioural features of interbank markets need not be taken as 
given by policy-makers, but can be expected to respond readily and predictably to changes in 
institutional arrangements (Prati et al.; 2003). This in turn implies that the analysis of 
possible structural breaks in the transmission of volatility along the yield curve might be 
readily used as a good indicator of the consequences of the quoted measures in monetary 
policy management. 
By relying on a common empirical framework for the USA and Euro area we showed 
that the conditional overnight volatility is a significant explanatory variable in the volatility 
equation of a GARCH model for the 1-month, 3-month, 12-month, 5-year and 10-year rates 
over the period ending in February 2006. This might have reflected an inadequate 
understanding of Central banks decision-making process or insufficient communication to 
the financial markets and the public at large. In addition, an imperfect design of the 
operational framework could have let financial market’s expectations about future policy 
decisions interfere with the standard overnight dynamics.  However, splitting the sample in 
order to isolate the most recent period of improved policy-making, we discovered that the 
volatility pass-through has entirely disappeared in both economies. In particular, through a 
structural break test procedure with unknown break-date we found evidence that the 
relationship broke down soon after specific interventions in the policy conduct of the FED 
and ECB. Although our exercise is not a direct test of the effectiveness of the changes in 
both monetary policy strategy and operational framework, our results are consistent with 
significant positive effects of the move towards a more open and gradual approach in the 
changes in the official interest rates and the improved operational setting devised by Central 
banks.  
In addition, our results are in line with the current findings of the empirical literature 
on monetary policy conduct. In particular, the improvement in private sector forecasts of 
short-term interest rates (Lange et al.; 2003, Swanson; 2006, Bauer et al.; 2006), the reduced    19
macroeconomic and financial volatility (Cecchetti; 2006, CGFS; 2006) and the increased 
predictability of the Central bank decisions (Bernoth and von Hagen; 2004, Wilhelmsen and 
Zaghini; 2005, Ehrmann and Fratzscher; 2006) are all aspect that may be directly or 
indirectly linked to the new era of openness, transparency and gradualism.  Appendix 
 
Table A1 
Data definition 
  Policy rate  Overnight  1-month   3-month   12-month   5-year   10-year  
           
USA  Federal 
funds target 
rate 
Federal 
funds 
effective 
rate 
LIBOR US 
dollar 1-
month 
LIBOR US 
dollar 3-
month 
LIBOR US 
dollar 12-
month 
yield on the 
5-year 
Treasury 
benchmark  
yield on the 
10-year 
Treasury 
benchmark  
Euro area  rate on the 
main 
refinancing  
operations
1)
EONIA EURIBOR 
1-month 
EURIBOR 
 3-month 
EURIBOR 
 12-month 
yield on the 
5-year 
German 
government 
benchmark   
yield on the 
10-year 
German 
government 
benchmark  
1) For MROs held through variable rate tenders we took the minimum bid rate (the lower limit at which 
counterparties   may submit bids. 
Source: Datastream 
 
Table A2 
Dummy specification 
EM  End of month 
BM  Beginning of month 
EQ  End of quarter 
EY  End of  year 
EMP  End of maintenance period 
EEMP  One day before the end of the maintenance period 
EEEMP  Two days before the end of the maintenance period 
9/11/2001  Last three days of the maintenance period including 11
th Sept 2001 and first day 
of the following maintenance period  
     
 
Table A3  
Structural break in the overnight market 
 
Fed Funds 
  
θ   -0.0024  *  ν   0.0070 ** 
ρ   -0.7853  **  α    0.3755 ** 
φ1 0.0874  **  β    0.0475 ** 
φ2 0.0731  **  γ  0.0255  
φ3 0.0923  **  ψEM 0.0030 * 
η0 0.5868  **  ψEQ 0.2522 ** 
ωEM 0.0714  **  ψEEEMP 0.0005 * 
ωBM 0.0303  **  ψEEMP 0.0029 ** 
ωEQ 0.3503  **  ψEMP 0.0010 ** 
ωEY -0.6030  **  duBREAK  -0.0061 ** 
ωEEEMP 0.0202  **     
ωEMP 0.0150  *     
ω9/11/2001 -1.0739  ** 
    
    
EONIA 
          
θ   0.0043    ν   0.0029 ** 
ρ   -0.2297  **  α    0.3885 ** 
φ1 -0.0536  *  β    0.2676 ** 
η0 0.4007  **  ψEM 0.0012 ** 
ωEM 0.0360  **  ψBM  -0.0034 ** 
ωEQ 0.0731  **  ψEEEMP 0.0049 ** 
      ψEEMP 0.0181 ** 
      ψEEMP  0.0352 ** 
     duBREAK  -0.0028 ** 
          
NOTE: Daily observations. Sample period: 1.3.1994 - 28.2.2006 for 
the USA and 1.1.1999 - 28.2.2006 for the Euro Area. An (two) 
asterisk(s) denotes statistical significance at 95% (99%). 
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